Real Options Model for Energy and Ancillary Services Markets by Goceliakova, Z.
Real Options Model for Energy and 
Ancillary Services Markets
Goceliakova, Z.
IIASA Interim Report
May 2003
 
Goceliakova, Z. (2003) Real Options Model for Energy and Ancillary Services Markets. IIASA Interim Report. IR-03-016 
Copyright © 2003 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/7065/ 
Interim Report on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
International Institute for Tel: 43 2236 807 342
Applied Systems Analysis Fax: 43 2236 71313
Schlossplatz 1 E-mail: publications@iiasa.ac.at
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria Web: www.iiasa.ac.at
Interim Report IR-03-016
Real Options Model for
Energy and Ancillary Services Markets
Zuzana Goceliakova´ (goceliak@ihs.ac.at)
Approved by
Sten Nilsson
Deputy Director and Leader, Forestry Project
May 2003
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited
review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National
Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Overview of Technical Details 2
2.1 Ancillary Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2 The Role of the Transmission System Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3 Simple Decisions 5
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3 An Online Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4 A Unit that is Possibly Oﬄine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5 Simple Decision Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4 Real Options Model 8
4.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2 Optimal Scheduling on the Electricity Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 The Proﬁt Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4 Feasible Bids (Technical Constraints) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5 The Online AS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.5.1 The Proﬁt Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.5.2 Feasible Bids (Technical Constraints) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.6 The Cost Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5 Numerical Results 13
5.1 Solution Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.1 The Optimal Dispatch Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.2 The Optimal Commitment Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2 Modeling Price Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.3 The Parameters of the Turbine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.4 Electricity as the Only Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.5 Two Outputs: Electricity and Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
6 Conclusion 22
– iii –
Abstract
Traditionally, power plant valuation is based only on its energy output. However, there
are other products that can increase its value, as a consequence of the liberalization of
energy markets, competitive markets for ancillary services are developing throughout the
world.
Under this new dynamic environment we introduce a valuation model, which covers
the presence of ancillary services markets. We analyze the opportunities of how the energy
producer can increase his proﬁt by providing these services. In the application, we evaluate
one turbine from a power plant situated in Germany. We perform a comparison of the
situation including and excluding the existence of ancillary services markets.
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1 Introduction
Over the last ten years many countries around the world have begun to restructure their
electric power industry and others will soon follow. Deregulation of electricity markets has
brought a substantial change in the operating environment for producers. Traditionally,
electric power companies have operated as vertically integrated and regulated monopolies
that generate, transmit and distribute power to the consumers. Given the ﬁxed electricity
price producers, the only uncertainty has been the actual demand. The optimal scheduling
has been arranged so that the level of the forecasted demand has been met and the
operating costs have been minimized.
Moving the electric industry away from its traditionally regulated monopoly structure
towards competition among companies is based on the needs that industry becomes more
cost saving, and that competition results in lower energy prices, better services, and more
customer choices for electric power. The key diﬀerence between the regulated environment
and competitive markets are the volatile market prices, which means that the electricity
producers face more risk. However, the deregulation process has been beneﬁcial for the
producers. They now have the ﬂexibility to decide for the more proﬁtable variant, namely
either to produce electricity (if the market price is high enough) or to buy it from the
market (if the costs of generation are higher than the market price).
As a consequence of the liberalization of energy markets, competitive markets for
ancillary services are developing throughout the world. Since there is no eﬃcient way
of storing electricity, a continuous balance between generation and the load of electricity
must be maintained. Ancillary services are necessary to support the reliable operation of
the grid when disturbances occur. The markets for electricity and ancillary services have
been established as separate markets in most countries. However, as ancillary services are
produced by the same equipment as electricity itself, they are also highly interdependent.
One diﬃculty for the electricity producer is to decide how to formulate bids to maximize
proﬁts from both of these markets simultaneously.
In this paper, we present a theoretical valuation model for a power plant. To illustrate
the introduced model, we evaluate one turbine from a combined heat and power (CHP)
plant situated in Germany. We use German price data (provided by the Leipzig Power
Exchange, Internet: www.lpx.de; and RWEnet, Internet: www.rwenet.de).
In the new dynamic environment traditional valuation approaches, such as net present
valuation (NPV), are no longer adequate methods for determining the value of generation
– 2–
assets. More elaborated valuation methods have to be used in order to develop the appro-
priate model. The valuation model introduced in this paper is based on the real options
approach developed in Tseng and Barz (2002).
Real options are based on the same principle as ﬁnancial options, that is to have a
“real option” means to have the right for a certain period to either choose for or against
some strategic decisions.
Real option strategies diﬀer from NPV analysis in their point of view relating to uncer-
tainty, that is instead of “fearing uncertainty and minimizing investment” they seek gains
from “uncertainty”. The incorporation of a wider range of possible actions into strategic
modeling makes the real options approach an applicable tool in investment analysis (Leslie
and Michaels, 1997).
There are two kinds of real options that a power plant faces: operational real options
and capital investment options. Operational real options oﬀer the possibility of making
short-term decisions concerning the production of electricity. Capital investment options
concern long-term decisions, for example investments in production technology, increasing
the amount of electricity the power plant can produce, or installing the equipment to
control emissions.
Hence, we seek an appropriate model to determine the value of a power plant under
the real options it faces. In this paper, two operational real options will be considered.
The ﬁrst covers the unit commitment decision, which is an option to produce electricity if
the market price is higher than the costs of generation or, if this is not the case, to turn
the generator oﬀ. The second option, which we will deal with, is the option to choose one
of the following alternatives: to generate electricity or to provide ancillary services.
Usually the valuation is only based on electricity production. Until today, the electric
industry has paid insuﬃcient attention to ancillary services. As market evidence from Cal-
ifornia and New England demonstrates (see Griﬀes et al., 1999), selling ancillary services
can be very proﬁtable and should therefore not be ignored in the real option analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by describing the technical details; diﬀer-
ent types of ancillary services are explained in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss the basic
consideration regarding ancillary services bidding. A simple numerical example demon-
strates the basic idea that providing ancillary services can increase the operational proﬁt.
In Section 4 we present the real option valuation model of generating assets, which covers
ancillary services. Section 5 contains the description of the solution procedure together
with the results of the application. The conclusions as well as further possible research
steps are presented in Section 6.
2 Overview of Technical Details
2.1 Ancillary Services
Ancillary services (AS) are a series of services that are “necessary to support the transmis-
sion of energy from generation sources to the consumers and to maintain reliable operations
of the transmission system”.1 The purpose of ancillary services is to compensate all possi-
ble deviations in the power balance that may occur between expected conditions and those
1Deﬁned by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in the USA.
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that actually occur. In this paper, we concentrate on a special category of services called
reserve services. Such services are able to support electricity production in peak times
when the load may exceed the expected value, for instance, due to climate inﬂuences, e.g.,
air temperatures below the long-term mean or due to short-term changes in consumption
habits.
The deregulation of energy markets has led to the creation of a competitive market for
ancillary services. The example of California has shown (see Brien, 1999) that the creation
of ancillary services markets is unavoidable — because of the absence of the ancillary
services markets and due to high market prices for electricity, producers in California
shifted their output entirely from ancillary services to electricity generation and the system
ended up without having any ancillary services available.
There is a lot of variety in the structure of ancillary services markets among diﬀerent
restructured systems. Typically a series of ancillary services is deﬁned and a classiﬁcation
is based on the quality and response time of the service. For illustration purposes we
introduce the key ancillary services of two markets: California and Germany.
2.1.1 Ancillary Services in California
For a description of ancillary services in California see, e.g., Hirst and Kirby (1997; 1998),
Hirst (2000), and Siddiqui et al., (2000).
• Regulation is an immediate response service that can adjust output quickly
(MW/minute) to moment-to-moment ﬂuctuations in customers’ loads.
• Spinning Reserve is the use of generating equipment that is online and synchronized
with the electrical system and can be fully available to respond to a signal within
10 minutes to provide energy.
• Non-Spinning Reserve is similar to spinning reserve, but it does not need to be online
and synchronized with the system, although it must respond within 10 minutes.
• Replacement Reserve is classiﬁed as incremental generation that can be obtained in
the next hour to replace spinning and non-spinning reserve used in the current hour.
• Black Start is the ability to start up and synchronize the generator to the system
without requiring power from the electrical system.
• Voltage Support is the use of transmission system equipment to inject or absorb
reactive power to maintain voltages on the transmission system within required
ranges.
Regulation, spinning, non-spinning, and replacement reserves can be provided by com-
petitive markets. Black start and voltage support are based more on the long-term basis.
For instance, voltage support service is expected to be physically applied close to the loca-
tion, where it has to aﬀect the actual electricity transmission. As a consequence, therefore,
it is not possible to create a competitive market for the last two services. Hence, they are
not relevant for the purposes of a real option analysis and may continue to stay regulated.
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2.1.2 Ancillary Services in Germany
In Germany the competitive market for ancillary services has just been developed. The
following four types of reserve services have been deﬁned (DVG, 2000):
• Primary Control Reserve is a stabilizing control, operating automatically in the
seconds range. All generating units with a nominal capacity greater than 100MW
must feature the primary control capability. It is used in both directions in the event
of a frequency deviation.
• Secondary Control Reserve is a seconds reserve for power control. It may be oﬀered
by all of the connected generating units. The positive and negative control directions
are awarded separately.
• Minute Reserve (Warm Reserve or Tertiary Reserve) may be oﬀered by all of the
connected generating units that are capable of injecting the agreed reserve power into
the network within 15 minutes. It is mainly oﬀered by storage stations, pumped-
storage stations, gas turbines, and thermal power stations operating at less than full
output.
• Hours Reserve (Cold Reserve or Stand-by Reserve) available in thermal power sta-
tions, which must be started for this purpose.
Primary and secondary reserve are contracted on the basis of long-term contracts and
are therefore not interesting from the viewpoint of short-term modeling. In this paper,
the analysis mainly focuses on the minute reserve. There are two kinds of minute reserve
traded on the market, namely positive and negative. Positive minute reserve (additional
generation of electricity) is needed in situations when it is necessary for the system to
compensate some losses. Negative reserve is required for consuming the excess electricity
out of the grid.
2.2 The Role of the Transmission System Operator
Without the transmission grid, electric power would never reach the consumer. A restruc-
tured competitive environment where generation is unbundled from transmission and dis-
tribution, has enforced the creation of a new entity — the Transmission System Operator
(TSO). The main objective of the system operator is to ensure the reliable operation of
the grid and safe transport of electric power. Moreover, the TSO
• is a non-proﬁt corporation;
• has the obligation and therefore the authority to control and, if necessary, to prohibit
power transfers and injections if there is a risk of system failure;
• speciﬁes which ancillary services should be provided, when, and by whom;
• is the only entity with suﬃcient and timely information to decide how much of each
service is required;
• sends signals to each generating unit that is providing the service;
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• does not own or operate any ancillary services; and
• has a crucial role because it is much more cost eﬀective to provide ancillary services
for the aggregate load than for each load separately.
2.2.1 System Operators in Germany
Germany is divided into six TSO areas of responsibility. In the numerical analysis we used
data only from the largest, namely the TSO controlled by the RWEnet.
3 Simple Decisions
3.1 Motivation
As a simple example of what the power plant achieves when bidding on the AS market,
consider the following simpliﬁed demonstration of the problem. A power plant uses a
generator with minimum and maximum generating capacities 140MWh and 284MWh,2
respectively and has the marginal cost of 10€/MWh. Suppose the actual hourly market
price is 12€/MWh. When bidding on the energy market only, the maximum hourly proﬁt
achieved by the power plant will be 284× (12− 10) = 568€/MWh.
Now suppose that there is the possibility to also bid on the AS market. The simplest
example is to consider just one service, e.g., a spinning reserve. Suppose that the actual
market price is 4€/MWh and the marginal cost is 1€/MWh. In this case, the power plant
owner may consider running the unit on its minimum generating level (naturally, the unit
has to be online for the time when a bid on the ancillary market was made) and thus
bidding just 140MWh on the energy market and the rest (144MWh) on the AS market.
The proﬁt under this scenario is: 140× (12− 10) + 144× (4− 1) = 712€/MWh.
The situation is even more interesting when the hourly price for electricity is smaller
than the marginal cost for energy generation, say 8€/MWh is the market price. Now,
instead of turning oﬀ the generator (which would be a natural choice without AS) the power
plant can consider a bid of the spinning reserve on the AS market — when running the
generator on its minimal capacity (necessary for the provision of spinning reserve) the rest
can still be bid on the AS market earning a positive proﬁt of 140×(8−10)+144×(4−1) =
152€/MWh.
3.2 Notation
We proceed in elaborating a simple decision model to show the basic diﬀerence between
the ancillary service, for which the generator must be online, and the ancillary service,
which one can bid on the AS market also when the generator is oﬀ.
Denote by:
2These parameters correspond to the operational characteristics of the turbine, which is analyzed in
Section 5.3.
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pE . . . the market price of electricity (€/MWh).
pAS . . . the market price of AS (€/MWh).
cE . . . the marginal cost for producing 1 MWh of electricity (€/MWh).
cAS . . . the marginal cost associated with providing 1 MWh of AS (€/MWh).
qE . . . the amount of capacity bid on the energy market (MWh).
qAS . . . the amount of capacity bid on the AS market (MWh).
qmax . . . the maximum generating capacity of the unit (MWh).
qmin . . . the minimum generating capacity of the unit (MWh).
3.3 An Online Unit
Consider ﬁrst the case of the ancillary service for which the generator must be online (e.g.,
spinning reserve in the Californian market or minute reserve in the German market).
We compare the optimal decision together with the maximum achievable proﬁts in
situations including and excluding the presence of the ancillary services markets, respec-
tively. In this simple example, the optimal decision is driven only by the market prices
and by the costs of production. Particularly, without the presence of the ancillary services
market:
• If pE > cE, the unit naturally decides for qE = qmax. In this case, the proﬁt is
(qmax − qmin)(pE − cE).
• If pE ≤ cE, then the unit decides to turn oﬀ (i.e., qE = 0). This leads to zero proﬁt.
With the option to invest on the AS market:
• If pE > cE and pE − cE ≥ pAS − cAS, then it will still be more proﬁtable to sell as
much energy as possible only to the energy market, that is qE = qmax and qAS = 0.
This means that the proﬁt is the same as in the situation without the presence of
the AS market:
(qmax − qmin)(pE − cE).
• However, if pE > cE and pE−cE < pAS−cAS, then the unit optimizes its production
by producing just the minimum generating capacity (qE = qmin) and provides the
remaining available capacity as a reserve: (qAS = qmax − qmin). This increases the
proﬁt to:
(qmax − qmin)(pAS − cAS) + qmin(pE − cE) > qmax(pE − cE).
• If pE ≤ cE and qmin(cE−pE) < (pAS−cAS)(qmax−qmin), then setting qE = qmin and
qAS = qmax − qmin leads to a positive proﬁt from providing AS instead of earning
zero proﬁt in the above case without AS:
(qmax − qmin)(pAS − cAS) + qmin(pE − cE) > 0.
• On the other hand, if pE ≤ cE and qmin(cE − pE) ≥ (pAS − cAS)(qmax − qmin), then
there is no better choice than to switch oﬀ the generator, which means qE = 0,
qAS = 0. Again, this leads to zero proﬁt.
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3.4 A Unit that is Possibly Oﬄine
Now consider an ancillary service that does not require a generator to be online for the
period when a bid is made (e.g., non-spinning reserve in California). Actually for pE > cE
the situation is quite similar to the case with the online generator. The only diﬀerence
here is the case when pE > cE , and pE − cE < pAS− cAS, e.g., when the provision of AS is
more proﬁtable than the generation of electricity. Since now, the generator does not need
to be online one can bid all of the capacity on the AS market.
This diﬀers, however, for pE ≤ cE , since without the need to be online, the generator
can make some proﬁt from the AS market also when it is turned oﬀ, whereas the online
generator has to produce at least the minimum generating capacity in order to bid on the
AS market. This means, without the option to bid on the AS market:
• If pE ≤ cE unit decides to turn oﬀ (i.e., qE = 0). Then the proﬁt is zero.
However, with the option on the AS market:
• If pE ≤ cE and pAS − cAS > 0, then setting qE = 0 and qAS = qmax leads to positive
proﬁt from providing AS instead of earning zero proﬁt in the above case without the
presence of the AS market:
qmax(pAS − cAS) > 0.
• On the other hand, if pE ≤ cE and pAS − cAS ≤ 0, then there is, of course, no better
choice than to turn the generator oﬀ, which means qE = 0, qAS = 0. In which case
the proﬁt is also zero.
3.5 Simple Decision Model
The analysis of the diﬀerent cases in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 can be formalized by the following
proﬁt functions.
A Unit without the AS Bidding Option
f(qE , pE, cE) =
{
qE(pE − cE) if the unit is on
0 if the unit is oﬀ
subject to:
qmin ≤ qE ≤ qmax if the unit is on
qE = 0 if the unit is oﬀ.
An Online Unit
f(qE, qAS, pE, pAS, cE, cAS) =
{
qAS(pAS − cAS) + qE(pE − cE) if the unit is on
0 if the unit is oﬀ
subject to:
qmin ≤ qE ≤ qmax, 0 ≤ qAS ≤ qmax − qE if the unit is on
qE = 0, qAS = 0 if the unit is oﬀ.
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A Unit that is Possibly Oﬄine
f(qE, qAS, pE, pAS, cE, cAS) =
{
qAS(pAS − cAS) + qE(pE − cE) if the unit is on
qAS(pAS − cAS) if the unit is oﬀ
subject to:
qmin ≤ qE ≤ qmax if the unit is on
qE = 0 if the unit is oﬀ
and
0 ≤ qAS ≤ qmax − qE.
However, in this model the following real world constraints have been omitted for simplic-
ity:
• To turn the unit on/oﬀ, one has to consider additional costs. These costs may depend
on the time period the unit has spent in the particular state.
• The costs for producing the energy (qEcE) can be a more general function, in par-
ticular it can depend on the parameter describing the price of the fuel used for
producing electricity.
• When the generator owner bids on the AS market, he has to be prepared to respond
to the “call” for AS, that is to respond to a signal to activate the AS. In this case,
the unit that is possibly oﬄine has to be turned on. Moreover, the generator can
then expect an additional proﬁt from producing the called energy (according to the
amount of energy actually called). Moreover, such a “call” is a stochastic event.
• There are technical conditions on the generating unit connected with the way it
produces electricity, e.g., when the unit is on (or oﬀ, respectively), it can be turned
oﬀ only after the pre-deﬁned amount of time expires.
4 Real Options Model
In this section, a “real world” valuation model for a power plant with an AS bidding option
will be described. We extend the real option approach developed in Tseng and Barz (2002).
Two real options will be incorporated into the model — the unit commitment decision
and the option to invest on the AS market.
4.1 Notation
Denote by
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Variables:
pFt . . . the market price of fuel at time t.
pEt . . . the market price of electricity at time t.
pASt . . . the market price of AS at time t.
qEt . . . the amount of electricity generated at time t (excluding electricity gen-
erated on contingency).
qASt . . . the amount of capacity bid on the AS market at time t.
qCASt . . . incremental amount of electricity
3 called on contingency at time t.
ut . . . decision variable that indicates the unit commitment decision made at
time t (the value ut = 1 represents the decision to be on at time t+ 1,
whereas ut = 0 represents the decision to be oﬀ at time t+ 1).
xt . . . state variable that indicates how long the unit is in on mode (xt > 0) or
oﬀ mode (xt < 0), respectively.
4
Functions:
C(.), CAS(.) . . . the cost function.
Su(xt) . . . the start-up cost.
Sd(xt) . . . the shut-down cost.
Constants:
qmax . . . the maximum generating capacity of the unit.
qmin . . . the minimum generating capacity of the unit.
ton, toff . . . minimum up/down time of the generator.
tcold . . . number of periods leading to the completely cooled generator, if left
in the oﬀ-state.
τ . . . unit start-up time.
ν . . . unit shut-down time.
T . . . the time period that is considered.
We will assume that the fuel price and the incremental amount of called on electricity
contingency are fully and perfectly known at the time the bids are made. For simplicity,
we assume the fuel price to be constant.
For further analysis, it would be convenient to denote the proportion of the incremental
amount of called on electricity contingency with respect to the amount bid on the AS
market as αt, that is:
qCASt = αtq
AS
t .
2The incremental energy qCASt has to be injected into the system at time t, that is the TSO has to
signal its use in time t− 1.
3We use xt = 0 to indicate that the unit is starting up or shutting down at time t, hence it is unable to
respond to the signal or to produce electricity until the mode actually changes.
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In simulations (see Section 5) we will distinguish two cases with respect to αt — the
constant proportion (αt = α) and the random proportion.
4.2 Optimal Scheduling on the Electricity Market
First, consider the situation without the option to bid on the AS market. The aim is to
ﬁnd the optimal schedule for the operating unit over the entire planning period that leads
to maximum proﬁt.
4.3 The Profit Function
In the case when only a bid on the energy market can be made, the proﬁt function looks
like the following:
J0 = max
ut,qEt
E
T∑
t=0
[
f(xt, q
E
t , p
E
t , p
F
t )− Su(xt)ut − Sd(xt)(1− ut)
]
(1)
where
f(xt, q
E
t , p
E
t , p
F
t ) =
(
pEt q
E
t −C(q
E
t , p
F
t )
)
I {xt>0}
and I {.} denotes an indicator function:
I {x>0} =
{
1, if x > 0,
0, otherwise.
Shutdown costs Sd(xt) are assumed to be constant, that is:
Sd(xt) =
{
sd, if xt > 0
0, otherwise
(2)
for some suitable constant sd.
Further, we assume that the start-up cost Su depends on the amount of time that the
generator has already spent in the oﬀ-state. For such an assumption, we use the following
representation:
Su(xt) =


b1
(
1− ext/γ
)
+ b2, if − t
cold ≤ xt < −t
off
b1 + b2, if xt < −tcold
0, otherwise
(3)
where b1, b2, and γ are given constants. This means that for xt < −x
cold
t we treat the
cooling eﬀect in time as negligible.
4.4 Feasible Bids (Technical Constraints)
Naturally, there are technical constraints that a unit has to fulﬁll. This section deals with
these constraints.
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Minimum Up/Down Constraints. These constraints state that the unit commitment
decision can be made only if the power plant has already been turned on (or oﬀ, respec-
tively) for at least the minimum up (or down) time of the generator:
ut =


1, if 1 ≤ xt < t
on
0, if − toff < xt ≤ −1
ut−1, if xt = 0
0 or 1, otherwise.
(4)
State Transition Constraints. At any time, each unit can only be in one of the following
modes: online, oﬄine or “changing”. The last mode describes the situation when the unit
is in a commitment/decommitment decision lead time, i.e., the state of the unit is changing
from online to oﬄine or vice-versa.
The rules for determining the value of the state variable are quoted here depending on
the previous state and the unit commitment decisions:
xt =


min(ton, xt−1 + 1), if 0 < xt−1 and ut−1 = 1,
−1, if xt−ν = t
on and ut−ν = 0
max(−tcold, xt−1 − 1) if xt−1 < 0 and ut−1 = 0,
1, if xt−τ ≤ −t
off and ut−τ = 1
0, otherwise.5
(5)
Unit Capacity Constraints. When the unit is active, the amount of generated electricity
has to comply with the range [qmin, qmax] that is:
qmin I {xt>0} ≤ q
E
t ≤ q
max I {xt>0} . (6)
4.5 The Online AS
How does the proﬁt function change in the AS option case? In this section we introduce
a real option model in which one ancillary service is considered. Namely, we take into
account the service that can be provided only if the unit is online (e.g., the minute reserve
or the spinning reserve, respectively).
4.5.1 The Profit Function
The key characteristic of such a service is that the generator has to be online and synchro-
nized to the grid and has to start to produce additional energy within 15 minutes after the
signal. The total proﬁt will be increased by the proﬁt of selling the ancillary service, that
is by pASt q
AS
t and by the proﬁt from producing the energy on contingency, that is p
E
t q
CAS
t .
The associated costs of providing the service must be subtracted, i.e., qASt , q
CAS
t will enter
as new variables into the cost function. Hence, the modiﬁed proﬁt function, which covers
the possible proﬁt of bidding on the AS market, is as follows:
4This indicates that the unit is now in start-up or shut-down period, hence it is unable to produce
energy or supply AS.
–12 –
JAS0 = max
ut ,qEt ,q
AS
t
E
T∑
t=0
[
fAS(xt, q
E
t , q
AS
t , q
CAS
t , p
E
t , p
AS
t , p
F
t )− Su(xt)ut − Sd(xt)(1− ut)
]
(7)
where
fAS(xt, q
E
t , q
AS
t , q
CAS
t ,p
E
t , p
AS
t , p
F
t ) =
=
(
pEt (q
E
t + q
CAS
t ) + p
AS
t q
AS
t − C
AS(qEt , q
AS
t , q
CAS
t , p
F
t )
)
I {xt>0}
and functions Sd(xt) and Su(xt) are deﬁned by equations (2) and (3) respectively.
4.5.2 Feasible Bids (Technical Constraints)
This section deals with the technical constraints of electricity generation with respect to
AS. In the case of AS, it is also important to ask: When can a bid on the AS market be
made? In the case of the online AS the answer is easy: the unit has to be online at the
time period for which the bid has been made, i.e., I{xt>0} = 0⇒ q
AS
t = 0.
Minimum Up/Down Constraints. The minimum up/down constraints for the AS case
are identical to the case when no AS option is available, as stated by equation (4).
State Transition Constraints. The state transition constraints for the AS case are
identical to the case when no AS option is available, as stated by equation (5).
Unit Capacity Constraints. The unit capacity constraints for the AS case are identical
to the case when no AS option is available, as stated by equation (6).
AS Restriction Constraints. It is possible to bid the maximum available reserve ca-
pacity, if the generator is on, and none otherwise:
0 ≤ qASt ≤ (q
max − qEt ) I {xt>0} . (8)
AS Satisfaction Constraints. The last restriction describes the fact that the TSO
cannot request more energy than has been bid on the AS market. We restrict the AS to
providing the positive amount of additional energy only:
0 ≤ qCASt ≤ q
AS
t .
Equivalently stated:
qCASt = αtq
AS
t αt ∈ [0, 1]. (9)
4.6 The Cost Function
It is standard (see, e.g., Tseng and Barz, 2002; Hlouskova et al., 2002) to model the cost
function associated with running the unit by a quadratic dependence with respect to the
amount of electricity to be produced. Hence, for the case when there is no AS bid option,
the cost function is deﬁned by:
C(qEt , p
F
t ) =
(
a0 + a1q
E
t + a2
(
qEt
)2)
pFt . (10)
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We assume that all of the coeﬃcients (a0, a1, and a2) are positive. Note that the compo-
nent a1q
E
t p
F
t is the major component of the cost function and a0p
F
t is the cost associated
with running the generator with no electricity output and only maintaining the immediate
availability of the unit. From a2 > 0 it follows that the cost function is convex.
With this meaning in mind, the cost function changes when introducing the AS bid
option as follows :
CAS(qEt , q
AS
t , q
CAS
t , p
F
t ) =
(
a0 + a1(q
E
t + q
CAS
t ) + a2
(
qEt + q
CAS
t
)2)
pFt . (11)
Actually, there are no additional costs (except for perhaps administrative costs which we
neglect) associated with bidding on the AS market itself (that is with qASt ). Only the
amount of electricity that will actually be generated on contingency (qCASt ) is relevant.
5 Numerical Results
5.1 Solution Techniques
The numerical method for ﬁnding the optimal solution of the models formulated in the
previous section requires integrating the forward-moving Monte Carlo simulation with
backward-moving dynamic programming.6 We use a slight modiﬁcation of the algorithm
described in Tseng and Barz (2002), which has been extended for our purposes. Therefore,
we only introduce the basic ideas of the solution procedure.
In order to use the simulation and dynamic programming techniques, we must be able
to solve our optimization problem starting at any time point. Therefore, we deﬁne
Jt(xt, ut, p
E
t , p
F
t ) = max
ui,qEi
E
T∑
i=t
[
f(xi, q
E
i , p
E
i , p
F
i )− Su(xi)ui − Sd(xi)(1− ui)
]
(12)
JASt (xt, ut, p
E
t , p
AS
t , p
F
t ) =
max
ui,qEi ,q
AS
i
E
T∑
i=t
[
fAS(xi, q
E
i , q
AS
i , q
CAS
i , p
E
i , p
AS
i , p
F
i ) −
− Su(xi)ui − Sd(xi)(1− ui)] .
Here, we assume that the prices, states, and decisions at time-point t are known and
serve as inputs for Jt and J
AS
t . On the other hand, the prices, states, and decisions at
time points (t+ 1), . . . , T have to be either simulated or determined.
At each time point, two problems have to be solved simultaneously: the optimal com-
mitment problem and the dispatch problem.
• The commitment decision (that is the decision whether the generating unit should
be on or oﬀ) is based on the current price and its eﬀect on future prices. The
simulation will be used to capture this future eﬀect. This simulation works under
the assumption that price processes for electricity and for the ancillary services,
respectively, are Markov.
6By “moving” we mean moving in time.
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• Additionally, once it has been decided that the unit should be on, the optimal
dispatch problem has to be solved, that is the optimal production level of electricity
and the optimal amount of reserve has to be determined.
5.1.1 The Optimal Dispatch Problem
From these problems, the optimal dispatch problem is easier to solve since there is a
corresponding analytical solution. Without an option to bid on the AS market, one solves
the following problem (see equations (1) and (4)):
max
qE
t
[
pEt q
E
t −C(q
E
t , p
F
t )
]
subject to
qmin ≤ qEt ≤ q
max.
Its optimal solution is determined as follows:
qˆEt = min
(
qmax,max
(
qmin,
1
2a2
(
pEt
pFt
− a1
)))
. (13)
If there is an option to bid on the AS market, one solves the following problem (see
equations (7), (4), (8), and (9)):
max
qE
t
,qAS
t
[
pEt (q
E
t + αtq
AS
t ) + p
AS
t q
AS
t − C
AS(qEt , q
AS
t , q
CAS
t , p
F
t )
]
subject to
qmin ≤ qEt ≤ q
max
0 ≤ qASt ≤ q
max − qEt .
This problem has an analytical solution, too. It can be derived using the standard op-
timization techniques. Given the constraints, the following candidates for the optimal
solution must be considered:
qEt,1 = min
(
qmax,max
(
qmin,
1
2a2(1− αt)
(
pEt
pFt
−
pASt
(1− αt)p
F
t
− (a1 + 2a2αtq
max)
)))
qASt,1 = q
max − qEt,1
qEt,2 = q
min
qASt,2 = min
(
qmax − qmin ,max
(
0,
1
2a2αt
(
pASt
αtpFt
+
pEt
pFt
− a1
)
−
qmin
αt
))
qEt,3 = min
(
qmax,max
(
qmin,
1
2a2
(
pEt
pFt
− a1
)))
qASt,3 = 0.
(14)
Among these three cases the optimal solution is the pair (qˆEt , qˆ
AS
t ), which gives the greatest
value of the objective function.
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5.1.2 The Optimal Commitment Problem
In the previous section, we presented the analytical solution of the optimal dispatch prob-
lem for the case when the unit is on. Naturally, if the unit is oﬀ, no electricity can be
produced and no AS can be bid (recall that we are only interested in the online unit analy-
sis). The existence of such a solution reduces the complex problem to the optimal decision
making commitment: it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd the optimal series of decisions with respect
to turning the unit on or oﬀ (and complying with the technical constraints at the same
time). The actual optimal electricity production and AS bids will then be determined by
equations (13) and (14), respectively.
The commitment or decommitment decision cannot be made for every state xt ar-
bitrarily. The power plant owner can only actually make a decision in states xt = t
on
and xt ∈ [−t
cold,−toff]. For other states xt his decision is driven by the constraints (see
equation (5)). We denote any of the states ton and [−tcold,−toff ] as xˆt.
We proceed as follows: Since the commitment/decommitment decision is driven by the
current prices pEt and p
AS
t and their future expectations, we calculate the critical prices pˆ
E
t
and (pˆEt , pˆ
AS
t ), that is the prices that can change the commitment/decommitment decision
of the power plant owner. This is achieved by solving the equations:
Jt(xˆt, ut = 1, p
E
t , p
F
t ) = Jt(xˆt, ut = 0, p
E
t , p
F
t ) (15)
and
JASt (xˆt, ut = 1, p
E
t , p
AS
t , p
F
t ) = J
AS
t (xˆt, ut = 0, p
E
t , p
AS
t , p
F
t ) (16)
in the case without and with the AS bid opportunity, respectively.
The prices and price pairs that satisfy equations (15) and (16) form the so-called
indiﬀerence locus. We compute the indiﬀerence loci for each time period t starting at time
T and moving backwards.
This is relatively easy without the presence of the AS market. We do this by ﬁnding
the root of the function:
h(y) = Jt(xˆt, ut = 1, y, p
F
t )− Jt(xˆt, ut = 0, y, p
F
t ) = 0.
When the AS market is presented, the indiﬀerence locus is formed by the price pairs
(pˆEt , pˆ
AS
t ). Theoretically, there are inﬁnitely many price pairs that ﬁt equation (16). In
practice, we set the value of the electricity price pˆEt from the pre-speciﬁed range and ﬁnd
the corresponding ancillary services price as a root of the equation:
hAS(y) = JASt (xˆt, ut = 1, pˆ
E
t , y, p
F
t )− J
AS
t (xˆt, ut = 0, pˆ
E
t , y, p
F
t ) = 0.
In this way, we obtain the suﬃciently dense net of indiﬀerence locus points. Hence, we
change the problem logic from the continuous space to the discrete space and for practical
purposes we approximate the continuous indiﬀerence loci using the pre-computed price
pairs. This reduces the computation complexity.
Assuming that the indiﬀerent locus is known at time t, the optimal value of the decision
variable ut can be easily determined by comparing the observed actual price p
E
t or price
pair (pEt , p
AS
t ), respectively, and the appropriate values from the indiﬀerence locus (see
Tseng and Barz, 2002 for more details).
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Input: starting time point t0, starting state xt0 , commitment decision for the starting
time point ut0 , electricity price for the starting time point p
E
t0
, fuel price for the
starting time-point pFt0 .
Constants: number of simulations n≫ 0, ending time point T ≥ t0.
Step 1: For i← 1 to n repeat Steps 2–9.
Step 2: Set J (i) ← 0.
Step 3: For t← t0 to T repeat Steps 4–9.
Step 4: If t = t0 then set x
(i)
t ← x
(i)
t0
, u
(i)
t ← ut0, p
E(i)
t ← p
E
t0
, p
F(i)
t ← p
F
t0
and go to
Step 7. Otherwise go to Step 5.
Step 5: Obtain the prices pEt , p
F
t by simulation.
Step 6: Determine u
(i)
t using equation (4). If the unit commitment decision can be
made, compare (for the corresponding xt) the current price p
E
t with the critical
price on the indiﬀerence locus.
Step 7: Determine the optimal production qˆ
E(i)
t using equation (13).
Step 8: J (i) ← J (i) + f
(
x
(i)
t , qˆ
E(i)
t , p
E(i)
t , p
F(i)
t
)
− C
(
qˆ
E(i)
t , p
F(i)
t
)
− Su
(
x
(i)
t
)
u
(i)
t −
Sd
(
x
(i)
t
)(
1− u
(i)
t
)
.
Step 9: Determine x
(i)
t+1, x
(i)
t+ν , x
(i)
t+τ using equation (5).
Output: Return 1
n
∑n
i=1 J
(i), the average value obtained by simulation.
Figure 1: The algorithm for computing Jt assuming all future indiﬀerence loci are known.
The algorithm for computing Jt (and J
AS
t ) is depicted in Figure 1 (and 2). In order
to determine the indiﬀerence loci associated with time point t using equations (15) and
(16), the computations of Jt (or J
AS
t ) according to our algorithm are necessary. These
computations require knowledge of indiﬀerence loci, however, only for the time points
(t+1), . . . , T . Therefore, it is possible to compute the indiﬀerence loci moving backwards
in time, starting at T .
5.2 Modeling Price Processes
In order to perform the algorithms for computing Jt (and J
AS
t ), the forward simulation of
the price processes (for pEt and p
AS
t ) is necessary. (Recall that we do not simulate the price
process for fuel price pFt since, for simplicity, we assume that the fuel price is constant.) For
modeling electricity prices, we consider the hourly data from the Leipzig Power Exchange
(LPX) starting on 1 August 2001 until 30 April 2002. Among the diﬀerent models that
describe the electricity price process (see, e.g., Knittel and Roberts, 2001) we follow the
analysis of the LPX prices in Cuaresma et al., 2002). The model with the best forecasting
performance for the whole time series has the following AR(1) representation:
ln
(
pEt
)
= αEt + β
E ln
(
pEt−1
)
+ νEt (17)
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Input: starting time point t0, starting state xt0, commitment decision for the
starting time point ut0, electricity price for the starting time point p
E
t0
,
ancillary services price for the starting time point pASt0 , fuel price for the
starting time point pFt0.
Constants: number of simulations n ≫ 0, ending time point T ≥ t0, the pro-
portion of the bid AS amount, generated on contingency α ∈ 〈0, 1〉.
Step 1: For i← 1 to n repeat Steps 2–9.
Step 2: Set J(i) ← 0.
Step 3: For t← t0 to T repeat Steps 4–9.
Step 4: If t = t0 then set x
(i)
t ← x
(i)
t0
, u
(i)
t ← ut0, p
E(i)
t ← p
E
t0, p
AS(i)
t ← p
AS
t0 ,
p
F (i)
t ← p
F
t0 and go to Step 7. Otherwise go to Step 5.
Step 5: Obtain the prices pEt , p
AS
t , p
F
t by simulation.
Step 6: Determine u
(i)
t using equation (4). If the unit commitment decision
can be made, compare (for the corresponding xt) the current price pair
(pEt , p
AS
t ) with the critical price on the indiﬀerence locus.
Step 7: Determine optimal production (qˆ
E(i)
t , qˆ
AS(i)
t ) using equation (14).
Step 8: J(i) ← J(i) + fAS
(
x
(i)
t , qˆ
E(i)
t , qˆ
AS(i)
t , αqˆ
AS(i)
t , p
E(i)
t , p
AS(i)
t , p
F (i)
t
)
−
CAS
(
qˆ
E(i)
t , qˆ
AS(i)
t , αqˆ
AS(i)
t , p
F (i)
t
)
− Su
(
x
(i)
t
)
u
(i)
t − Sd
(
x
(i)
t
)(
1− u
(i)
t
)
.
Step 9: Determine x
(i)
t+1, x
(i)
t+ν , x
(i)
t+τ using equation (5).
Output: Return 1n
∑n
i=1 J
(i), the average value obtained by simulation.
Figure 2: The algorithm for computing JASt assuming all future indiﬀerence loci are known.
where βE is assumed to be constant, νEt is a white noise with constant variance (σ
E)2 and
αEt is deﬁned as:
αEt = α
E +
24∑
i=1
αE1,i IHour(t,i)+
4∑
i=1
αE2,i I Season(t,i)+α
E
3 IWeekend(t) .
The predicate Hour(t, i) is true, if the time point t corresponds to the i-th hour of the
day; the predicate Season(t, i) is true, if the time point t corresponds to the i-th season of
the year; and ﬁnally the predicate Weekend(t) is true, if the time point t corresponds to
the weekend.
This model captures two important features of electricity price behavior: mean rever-
sion and seasonality. The estimated parameters of the model are expressed in Table 1.
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Table 1: Estimated parameters of the electricity price process.
βE 0.8873 αE1,7 0.2124 α
E
1,15 0.0545 α
E
1,23 0.1289
αE 0.2349 αE1,8 0.3609 α
E
1,16 0.0868 α
E
1,24 0
αE1,1 0.0442 α
E
1,9 0.2959 α
E
1,17 0.1695 α
E
2,1 −0.0232
αE1,2 −0.0588 α
E
1,10 0.2598 α
E
1,18 0.3233 α
E
2,2 −0.0386
αE1,3 0 α
E
1,11 0.2747 α
E
1,19 0.2175 α
E
2,3 0
αE1,4 0 α
E
1,12 0.3499 α
E
1,20 0.0895 α
E
2,4 0
αE1,5 0.0795 α
E
1,13 0 α
E
1,21 0.0746 α
E
3 −0.0494
αE1,6 0.1773 α
E
1,14 0.0818 α
E
1,22 0 (σ
E)2 0.0378
For modeling the reserve price process, we consider the data of positive minute reserve
(provided by the RWE grid operator) starting on 1 August 2001 until 30 April 2002. Such
reserve is traded in ﬁve blocks per day, namely, the following blocks of hours have been
stated: 1–4, 5–8, 9–16, 17–20, 21–24.
The selection of the appropriate model for estimating the reserve prices is not straight-
forward. As the corresponding market has only been open for one year, there are no time
series studies of the market prices available at the moment. Nevertheless, bearing in mind
the purpose of using this model for simulation (especially as our algorithm requires the
simulated process to be Markov), we considered the following representation:
ln
(
pASt
)
= αASt + β
AS ln
(
pASt−1
)
+ νASt (18)
where βAS is assumed to be constant and νASt is a white noise with constant variance(
σAS
)2
. Since the minutes reserve is traded in blocks, t refers to the block-time in this
case.
Again, we consider the seasonal and weekend eﬀect of the block, hence αASt is the time
varying mean deﬁned as:
αASt = α
AS +
5∑
i=1
αAS1,i I Block(t,i)+
4∑
i=1
αAS2,i I Season(t,i)+α
AS
3 IWeekend(t) .
The predicate Block(t, i) is true, if the time point t corresponds to the i-th block of the
day. The meaning of predicate Season(t, i) and Weekend(t) is identical to the electricity
price process case. The estimated parameters of the AS price process are listed in Table 2.
5.3 The Parameters of the Turbine
As an application, we evaluate a combined heat and power plant situated in Germany.
More precisely, we consider just one turbine and its operational characteristics are listed
in Table 3.7
7Source: BEWAG, Berlin, Germany, which is gratefully acknowledged for providing the parameters of
one of their turbines.
–19 –
Table 2: Estimated parameters of the AS price process.
βAS 0.1159 αAS1,4 0.7104 α
AS
2,4 0.2967
αAS 0.7389 αAS1,5 0 α
AS
3 −0.5265
αAS1,1 −0.1513 α
AS
2,1 0.1525 (σ
AS)2 0.11
αAS1,2 0 α
AS
2,2 −0.1470
αAS1,3 1.7123 α
AS
2,3 0
Table 3: The operational parameters of the turbine.
qmin qmax ton toff tcold τ ν b1 b2 γ sd
140 MWh 284 MWh 4h 4h 4h 1h 1h 1900 720 2 220€
The fuel for this turbine is coal. We assume a constant coal price of 5.67E/MMBtu. The
cost function has the following quadratic representation:
a0 = 78.8 a1 = 1.98 a2 = 0.00111.
Therefore,
C(qEt , p
F
t ) =
(
78.8 + 1.98qEt + 0.00111
(
qEt
)2 )
pFt
CAS(qEt , q
AS
t , q
CAS
t , p
F
t ) =
(
78.8 + 1.98
(
qEt + q
CAS
t
)
+ 0.00111
(
qEt + q
CAS
t
)2 )
pFt .
However, we have to deal with the amount of electricity called on contingency (qCASt )
or equivalently with the parameter αt in expression:
qCASt = αtq
AS
t .
Since there are currently no real data available for the estimation of qCASt or αt, we consider
the following two situations in the numerical analysis of the model:
• Parameter αt is assumed to be constant (i.e., αt = α). In our simulations we use the
value α = 10%.
• Parameter αt will be generated at random. Since we cannot estimate the real data for
αt, we handle this randomness merely as a numerical experiment. With a probability
of 75% we take αt = 0. With a probability of 25% we choose αt to be a random
number from the uniform distribution (the uniformity is taken with respect to the
interval [0, 1]). This choice corresponds to the real situation (although the numerical
values may diﬀer). Once a certain amount of generation capacity has been sold as
a reserve, the unit must be prepared to respond to the “call” from the TSO. The
TSO will require additional energy when unpredictable disturbances occur in the
grid. The required amount is also unpredictable.
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Figure 3: Optimal commitment rules for 28–29 April 2002. The dashed line (with symbol ·)
is the turn-on barrier, the solid line (with symbol ∗) is the turn-oﬀ barrier and the solid
bold line depicts the actual electricity prices.
5.4 Electricity as the Only Output
We start our numerical analysis by studying a situation when electricity is regarded as
the only output of the turbine. This is the situation without the possibility of bidding
on the AS market. We follow the analysis introduced in Hlouskova et al. (2002). In the
next section we refer to this analysis and compare it to the two output models introduced
in Section 4. The model in which electricity is regarded as the only output, is actually a
special case of a two-output model. It is equivalent to the situation when the ancillary
service price is zero.
First of all, the indiﬀerence loci have to be calculated (see the description in Sec-
tion 5.1.2). In our case, there are two loci: the ﬁrst corresponds to xt = t
on = 4 and
the second corresponds to xt = −t
off = −tcold = −4. The ﬁrst is called a down locus or
a turn-oﬀ barrier and the second is called an up locus or a turn-on barrier. Hence, two
curves (the turn-on and the turn-oﬀ barriers) have been obtained by simulation, which
are depicted in Figure 3, together with the electricity spot prices for 28–29 April 2002.
Following the description in Section 5.1.2, the turn-on barrier indicates that if the spot
price is above the curve, and the turbine has already been oﬀ for at least its minimum
oﬀ-time, then it is optimal to turn the turbine on. Similarly, when the spot price is below
the turn-oﬀ barrier and the turbine has already been on for at least its minimum on-time
then the optimal decision is to turn the unit oﬀ.
Once the loci have been calculated, following the optimal commitment rules, an ex-
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Table 4: Optimal decision rules — electricity as the only output.
Time Dec. State Prod. Cum. Time Dec. State Prod. Cum.
t ut xt qˆ
E
t Proﬁt t ut xt qˆ
E
t Proﬁt
1 0 −3 0 0 25 0 −1 0 2239
2 0 −4 0 0 26 0 −2 0 2239
3 0 −4 0 0 27 0 −3 0 2239
4 0 −4 0 0 28 0 −4 0 2239
5 0 −4 0 0 29 0 −4 0 2239
6 0 −4 0 0 30 1 −4 0 2239
7 0 −4 0 0 31 1 1 284 4862
8 0 −4 0 0 32 1 2 284 8117
9 0 −4 0 0 33 1 3 284 11256
10 1 −4 0 0 34 1 4 284 14511
11 1 1 284 648 35 1 4 284 18519
12 1 2 284 1771 36 1 4 284 25061
13 1 3 284 2419 37 1 4 284 29113
14 1 4 194.1 2210 38 1 4 284 32676
15 1 4 140 1777 39 1 4 284 35923
16 1 4 140 1095 40 1 4 284 38778
17 1 4 140 393 41 1 4 284 41196
18 1 4 150.4 88.3 42 1 4 284 43528
19 1 4 190.1 −131 43 1 4 284 45656
20 1 4 284 120 44 1 4 284 47577
21 1 4 284 941 45 1 4 284 49934
22 1 4 284 1902 46 1 4 284 52182
23 1 4 284 2758 47 1 4 284 53941
24 0 4 153.6 2239 48 1 4 284 54697
pected proﬁt of the turbine can be computed. The optimal policy together with cumulative
proﬁt calculation for 28–29 April 2002 is shown in Table 4. The data are shown on an
hourly basis (hour 1–hour 48), describing the optimal values (rounded) for the decision
variable ut, for the state variable xt, the optimal electricity production qˆ
E
t , and the cumu-
lative proﬁt obtained (in €). For the initial setup, we assume that the turbine has already
been oﬀ for three hours. This means that starting at hour 2, the turbine can be turned
on, since this situation complies with the minimum oﬀ-time constraint of the turbine. In
fact, as illustrated in Figure 3, it is not optimal to turn the turbine on before hour 10,
when the spot price for the ﬁrst time rises above the turn-on barrier. The spot price stays
above the turn-oﬀ barrier for the rest of the day and falls below at hour 24. At that time,
as Table 4 shows, it is optimal to turn the unit oﬀ and stay oﬀ during the night. Again at
6 a.m. the next day (hour 30), it is optimal to turn the turbine on.
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5.5 Two Outputs: Electricity and Reserve
Now consider the simulations including the option to bid on the AS market. We again
evaluate the turbine over 48 hours, using data from 28–29 April 2002. The indiﬀerence loci
must also be calculated in this case (see the description in Section 5.1.2), this time using an
approximation. Due to the higher dimension of the problem than before, we are not able
to depict the turn-on and turn-oﬀ barrier similarly to Figure 3. Nonetheless, the optimal
decisions are shown in Tables 5 and 6 for constant and random αt, respectively. The
columns correspond to the respective time point t (hour 1–hour 48), the optimal values
for the decision variable ut, for the state variable xt, the optimal electricity production qˆ
E
t
and AS bid qˆASt , and the cumulative proﬁt obtained. Additionally, the generated αt value
is shown in Table 6.
When compared to the analysis of the previous section, the cumulative proﬁt has
increased in the presence of the AS market, as expected. Moreover, one can observe the
changes in decision making of the power plant owner: if more advantageous, the owner
naturally bids on the AS market. The power plant is even turned on earlier (hours 10 and
30) than in the case without AS (hours 11, 31).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented the real options representation of the valuation model for
electricity producers. Two real options were considered, namely (1) unit commitment
decision, and (2) ancillary services provision.
The application of the model on the real data has conﬁrmed previous observations from
other markets. Participation in ancillary services markets has led to an increase in the
operating proﬁt. This fact demonstrates that the ancillary services markets can provide
signiﬁcant revenues to electricity producers and cannot be ignored. Therefore, an under-
standing of these markets is crucial when applying the real option analysis methodology.
The main advantage of the real options approach is its ﬂexibility of including a wide
range of options — our model can easily be extended to other types of ancillary services,
which are handled by the market. For instance, it could cover the negative minute re-
serve traded on the German market. Alterations of the model constraints, due to other
operational real options and new requirements, is another direction of future research.
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Table 5: Optimal decision rules in the case of electricity and AS markets (α = 10%).
Time Dec. State Prod. Cum. Time Dec. State Prod. Cum.
t ut xt qˆ
E
t /qˆ
AS
t proﬁt t ut xt qˆ
E
t /qˆ
AS
t proﬁt
1 0 −3 0/0 0 25 0 −1 0/0 4545
2 0 −4 0/0 0 26 0 −2 0/0 4545
3 0 −4 0/0 0 27 0 −3 0/0 4545
4 0 −4 0/0 0 28 0 −4 0/0 4545
5 0 −4 0/0 0 29 1 −4 0/0 4545
6 0 −4 0/0 0 30 1 1 140/144 5997
7 0 −4 0/0 0 31 1 2 140/144 8800
8 0 −4 0/0 0 32 1 3 280/0 12056
9 1 −4 0/0 0 33 1 4 280/0 15195
10 1 1 140/144 338 34 1 4 280/0 18450
11 1 2 234/50 999 35 1 4 280/0 22458
12 1 3 284/0 2122 36 1 4 280/0 28999
13 1 4 234/50 2783 37 1 4 280/0 33061
14 1 4 140/144 2905 38 1 4 280/0 36615
15 1 4 140/144 2801 39 1 4 280/0 39862
16 1 4 140/144 2423 40 1 4 280/0 42717
17 1 4 140/144 1921 41 1 4 280/0 45135
18 1 4 140/144 1857 42 1 4 280/0 47467
19 1 4 140/144 1871 43 1 4 280/0 49595
20 1 4 179/105 2178 44 1 4 280/0 51516
21 1 4 284/0 3000 45 1 4 280/0 53874
22 1 4 284/0 3960 46 1 4 280/0 56121
23 1 4 284/0 4816 47 1 4 280/0 57880
24 0 4 140/144 4545 48 1 4 280/0 58636
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Table 6: Optimal decision rules in case of electricity and AS markets (αt random).
Time Prop. Dec. State Prod. Cum. Time Prop. Dec. State Prod. Cum.
t αt ut xt qˆ
E
t /qˆ
AS
t proﬁt t αt ut xt qˆ
E
t /qˆ
AS
t proﬁt
1 0.62 0 −3 0/0 0 25 0.50 0 −1 0/0 4723
2 0.04 0 −4 0/0 0 26 0 0 −2 0/0 4723
3 0 0 −4 0/0 0 27 0.55 0 −3 0/0 4723
4 0 0 −4 0/0 0 28 0 0 −4 0/0 4723
5 0 0 −4 0/0 0 29 0.70 1 −4 0/0 4723
6 0 0 −4 0/0 0 30 0.09 1 1 140/144 6173
7 0.87 0 −4 0/0 0 31 0.24 1 2 140/144 9197
8 0 0 −4 0/0 0 32 0 1 3 284/0 12452
9 0 1 −4 0/0 0 33 0.74 1 4 140/144 16324
10 0 1 1 140/144 310 34 0 1 4 284/0 19579
11 0 1 2 260/24 961 35 0 1 4 284/0 23587
12 0.99 1 3 140/144 2425 36 0 1 4 284/0 30128
13 0 1 4 260/24 3077 37 0.12 1 4 284/0 34190
14 0 1 4 140/144 3191 38 0.87 1 4 140/144 38666
15 0.95 1 4 140/144 2875 39 0 1 4 284/0 41913
16 0 1 4 140/144 2534 40 0.023 1 4 284/0 44768
17 0.70 1 4 140/0 1832 41 0 1 4 284/0 47186
18 0 1 4 140/144 1768 42 0 1 4 284/0 49518
19 0 1 4 140/144 1773 43 0 1 4 284/0 51646
20 0.30 1 4 140/144 2134 44 0 1 4 284/0 53567
21 0 1 4 284/0 2956 45 0 1 4 284/0 55925
22 0 1 4 284/0 3916 46 0 1 4 284/0 58172
23 0.93 1 4 140/144 4995 47 0 1 4 284/0 59931
24 0 0 4 140/144 4723 48 0.03 1 4 284/0 60687
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